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Vassal and Fief in Three Lacustrine Kingdoms* The closely related societies of the Lakes area of East Africa are remarkable for the extreme hierarchical political arrangements they exhibit and which set them off from their neighbors
The three kingdoms Rwanda Buganda and Bunyoro1 selected for examina tion besides being institutionally similar have each been described by ethnographers and other observers as resembling the societies of medieval Europe that is as feudal societies or societies with feudal institutions The main theoretical problems raised by the applica tion of the feudal notion to African societies have already been clearly examined in an article by Jack Goody 1963 Recognizing the pitfalls he has exposed this paper will attempt to establish precise notion of the essential elements of the feudal archetype and test this notion against the cases presented by these three African societies
The experiences of western Europe from the ninth to the fourteenth century have given rise to the term feudalism to describe the dominant social and political institutions in many societies of that time and place Insofar as we can recognize in feudalism general method for organizing social relations capable of reproduction in another region and another era it is possible to analyze alien and unfamiliar social relations in terms of feudal model Bloch 1964:446 and Strayer and Coulborn 1956:3-14 Implicit in this is nrst the practicability of extracting from the varied cultural experiences of medieval feudal societies model with which to compare other societies Secondly there must in fact be societies sufficiently similar to the This paper results from research done at the University of California Los Angeles under the supervision of Professors Leonard Thompson and Daniel Biebuyck to whom thanks are owed for their encouragement and advice One kingdom from each of the three main subdivisions of the lacustrine cultural region model to warrant comparison which may increase our understand ing Furthermore in selecting model it is necessary to concentrate on the social relations which are relevant to denning the limits of that model and then to make comparisons with those social relations and not with other extraneous characteristics which may be present in both societies under examination Feudalism is unfortunately word rich in meanings and vague in connotations For nearly two centuries it has been used to connote political system of exploitation and of anachronistic values by enemies of that system This polemical term has been applied to eighteenth century France nineteenth century Russia and twentieth century Latin America on grounds of the existence of exploitation of an agricultural peasantry by landed aristocracy Much refine ment of this political usage must be made in order to prevent any hierarchical agrarian society from being termed feudal and thereby destroying the analytical value of the term for the comparative study of societies
The views of scholars on the concept of feudalism are numerous but fall into two rather broad categories of approach Goody 1963:1 The first approach is more general seeing feudalism as the dominant political and social organization during certain centuries of the Middle Ages Strayer 1956:15 The second definition is narrower focusing on those institutions creating and regulating the obligations of obedience and service ... on the part of one free man the vassal towards another free man the lord) and the obligations of protec tion and maintenance on the part of the lord with regard to his vassal Ganshof 1961 xx) Comparison in terms of the more general concept of feudalism while it has been attempted by others must inevitably suffer from the arbitrary selection of the institutions being compared While one cannot deny the significance for medieval Europe of the institu tions of Church mercantile towns knighthood and chivalry it is clearly impossible to base meaningful comparisons on the presence or absence of these unique institutions For this reason it seems preferable to isolate those institutions which form the core of the narrower technical definition of feudalism eliminating other coin cident institutions as extraneous to the concept of feudalism to be applied in comparative analysis
The core institutions to which allude are vassalage and fiefholding While several authorities consider the political functions fulfilled by these institutions sine qua non to the notion of feudal society Strayer 1956:16 Stephenson 1942:228-229 and Maquet 196 295-296) none of the authorities on the European material consulted in this essay have denied the fundamental importance of these special institutions to the concept of feudalism For this reason the absence of institutions whose content of social relations is not analogous to those of the vassalage and efholding complex would compel the abandonment of feudal terms for the purpose of scholarly comparison The question of the social or political role played by these institutions is relevant to the problem of comparison only when the core institu tions are in fact present
We must then extract the social content of the feudal bonds before beginning to look for these bonds the traditional systems of African States
Vassalage is founded upon legal contract known originally as by which two legally free men voluntarily enter personal relationship and assume obligations and rights of unequal quality relating to their social positions1
The obligations on the part of the social inferior the vassal are assumed by the performance of the act of homage and an oath of fealty2
These acts bound the vassal to the passive obligation of bearing faith and allegiance to his lord and the active obligation of performing some service generally of military nature for that lord We speak of fealty as passive in that it consists of nothing more than mental attitude of deference and loyalty and the negative obligation to do the lord no harm
The active obligation assumed in becoming the man involved the performance of personal service by the vassal This service especially in English feudalism was generally military service as mounted knight and was every where restricted to the upper classes of society
The vassal was retainer of his lord pledged to ght by his shield either as castle guard or in the neid against his enemies Stenton 1961:192 and Pollock and Maitland 1952 vol 1:252 This provided stable property basis to the personal dependency of vassalage upon which the whole structure of feudal relations could be erected
The division of ownership between the lord and vassal had farreaching consequences for the vassalage contract and the nature of social relations at the upper levels of European society Jolliffe 1937 139 ff. and Calmette 1923:44-56 The end product was system of interdependent efs burdened with military duties Instead of shifting agreements between contracting parties there arises hereditary relationship between lord and man on the basis of tenure Vinogradoff 1908:39
The tenure originally precarious became heritable conditional on paying homage and thus re-establishing the vassalage contract This became so generally the rule that the con tract of vassalage came to bind together two families over generations Furthermore governmental and judicial functions attached themselves to the combined institution of vassalage and ef
The vassal came to exercise political authority on behalf of his feudal overlord within the territory of this fief while specifically feudal judicial system developed in addition to the courts which served to adjudicate disputes arising from feudal contracts Ganshof 1961 :156-160 Pollock and Maitland 1952 :571 and Vinogradoff 1908 Neither administrative nor judicial functions however are inherent in either the vassalage relationship or the granting of fief The content of vassalage as social institution consists then of obligations to personal service and personal loyalty from the vassal to the lord and of protection and maintenance by the lord of his vassal
The essence of fief is to be found the grant of usufructuary rights in property from the lord to the vassal in fulfilment of the obligation of maintenance and with view to thus materially enabling the vassal to provide his personal service in exchange
We now proceed to the comparison of the basic feudal institution of vassalage and nefhold to those social relations found among the three interlacustrine Bantu kingdoms which appear analogous
From the first contacts of Europeans with the kingdoms of the Lakes region1 the terminology of feudalism began to be loosely applied to their political institutions In Buganda the kabaka was equated with medieval king and the leading and lesser chiefs were designated as barons earls or lords Indeed the broad outline of the political hierarchy with its delegation of territorial authority by the kabaka to his closely associated bakungu is remarkably analogous to the baronial regime of post-conquest England Stenton 1961:84-114 The system of personal estates which attached themselves to the highest and lowest political offices further reinforced the analogy It might readily be concluded that what the missionaries and travellers saw was system of royal vassalage the vassal exercising adminis trative judicial and military authority as service to his lord the kabaka receiving in exchange precarious tenure estate as his main tenance for that service Certainly the bakungu were thought to owe total allegiance and fidelity as well as consilium to the reigning monarch
The apparent anomaly of the absence of precise and legal reciprocal obligation of protection due from the kabaka to the bakungu might be considered exceptional due to the theoretically absolute nature of Ganda kingship However it would be erroneous to consider it so In Buganda the kabaka was considered the source of all political authority the ritual head of all the clans and by virtue of both of these the ultimate owner of all the land and wealth of the country Southwold 1965:90-91 In appointing chiefs and officials terri torial ritual or household the kabaka delegated his authority It is from this act that the governmental structure of Buganda as well as the confusion of European observers arise
The bakungu whether they were clan heads or functionaries who were selected by the kabaka for any of number of reasons stood in relationship of administrative subordination to the monarch They like the counts of the Carolingian Empire were officers of government exercising political authority over the population resident in their counties or ssaza This is averred by the Ganda proverb afuga ttaka afuga bantu He rules the people not the land Mair 1934:158
It has been necessary to ignore developmental factors and treat these societies in the anthropological present based on the traditional situation at the time of European contact and Fallers 1960:34
The bakungu were required to rule the name of the kabaka to collect the tribute and taxes to levy royal armies and to administer the justice This was their primary function
The services and the loyalty owed by miikungu to the kabaka were those of political subordinate to his ruler of minister to his monarch not of vassal to his lord The estates claimed by bakungu bear only slight resemblance to fiefs The land is in fact the property of the political office being transfered from one official to the next The holder could not subinfeudate i.e select subordinates to perform his service by distributing his estates to them Once largely hereditary these estates with few exceptions became the unrestricted gift of the kabaka by the late nineteenth century Mair 1934:159-161 and Cox 1950 Insofar as the estates serve to maintain the office-holder they do appear as benefices held in precarium comparable to the benefices in land of Merovingian and Carolingian Europe Ganshof 1961:9-12 36-40 Nonetheless the element of royal benefice was at best secondary attribute of an administrative district assigned to political officials There remains the question of the feudal elements of vassalage and fief in the position of the particular type of Ganda chief known as batongole According to Audrey Richards The Ganda 1959:50) Not content with the appointment of their own supporters as territorial rulers later Kabakas took to giving out land to their own favorites as fiefs in return for some such duty as raising soldiers collecting firewood or barkcloth or performing ritual services These estates were known as bitongole sing. kifongoîe and their holders as batongole Originally appointed to bolster the power these independent landholders were outside the administrative hierarchy being solely responsible to the kabaka and not to his territorial chief Because landholding and political authority were inseparable the mutongole governed the people who lived on his estate and thus acted as minor chief Southwold 1965:90
The political role was here second ary to the relation of personal dependence and obligation the batongole being originally and fundamentally the favorites of the kabaka By the grant of the benefice the mzttongole was bound by personal ties to his benefactor His loyalty was something more than that of mere subordinate or other subject The element of service is largely undefined with nothing as clear cut as service being required Rather in addition to the governmental duties usually they also had some special duty to perform for the kabaka Southwold 1960:12
In return for these vague services and loyalty the kabaka granted an estate and his protection in the form of immunity from responsibility to his territorial authorities whose hostility might be aroused by the privileges and occasional duties as the spy Southwold 1960:13) The position of batongole was never hereditary
Only the kabaka could be the lord of mutongole No subinfeudation was possible nor was personal military service part of the obligations Despite these differences from the European feudal practice it would seem that mutongole as the man had much in common with royal granted honores political authority by Carolingian monarch Ganshof 1961:52-56
While we may be permitted to con clude that some form of feudo-vassalage existed among the Ganda it would be fallacious to deduce that the performance of political functions depends on personal agreements and that political authority is treated as private possession Stray er and Coulborn
1956:5) as in European cases
Moreover feudo-vassalage institutions were neither so pervasive nor so important as to warrant the applica tion of the term feudalism to Buganda society as whole On the contrary the principle and practice of the butongole institution was of relatively recent introduction1 and most political institutions especially the most important chieftainships bakungu) retained the character of administrative representatives of royal power and authority Feudal forms are subsidiary to political forms Following David Apter regard to Buganda we prefer to call it political kingdom rather than feudal one Apter 1961:9)
To the North and West of Buganda lies the closely related kingdom of Bunyoro sharing with Buganda common origin and similar ideas and practices of political organization To examine this monarchy for the traces of feudal institutions we will rely largely upon the ethnographic work of John Beattie who has been most explicit in his application of feudal terminology to the political relations of the Nyoro State
He contends that Bunyoro preserves many of the characters of centralized feudal State oddly reminiscent in many ways of the feudal kingdoms which existed centuries ago in Europe and elsewhere Beattie 1961:5
Feudalism for Beattie means kind of political system which is based on the relation between superior and his inferior or vassal where the latter holds lands and authority over the people living on these lands in feud from the The practice was probably introduced during the reign of Mawanga the twenty-second kabaka sometime in the early or mid-eighteenth century SOUTH WOLD 1960:12) former. Central to this conception of feudalism is the personal nature of the bond of political dependence and the association of political office with the holding of landed estates Beattie 1964:26)1 As we have seen in the Buganda case cautious examination of the bond of dependence and the system of territorial authority and estates is required before the concepts of vassal and fief can be applied
In Bunyoro political authority was focused in the person of the mühama Radiating from this center was system of hereditary territorial chieftainships Taylor 1962:35 These chieftainships both large and small were granted by the mühama to various categories of individuals including members of his own Bito ruling line pastoral Hima or agricultural Iru generally of chiefly lines affinal or maternal kin of the mühama or even his household officials or favorites Tra ditionally chiefly authority was not thought of as hereditary though it often tended to become so. Beattie 1961:36 and 1959:104. Regard less of its heritability it was always considered as the gift of the mühama which he confirmed to heirs and which he could retract This is true in principle of all the levels of chieftainship which were in vaguely demarcated hierarchy Unlike Buganda great chiefs might have directly under them lesser chiefs of their own making who might in turn have subordinate chiefs to themselves Thus at all levels we find repetition of the bond of political dependence which is initiated by the mühama and his directly subordinate great chiefs As with the Ganda the delegation of political authority is confounded with the distribution of land on dependent tenure In unravelling the relationship of mühama to chief or of chief to subchief and of each to the land they hold we will approach some understand ing of these so-called feudal relations All political authority in Bunyoro was essentially territorial chief in his capacity as an agent of government rules over people resident within the territory assigned him on behalf of the mühama as head of State and owner of the country This is true whether his authority is by direct delegation of the mühama or through an intermediate authority
The territory is unit of local or regional government not fief To say that it is held on condition of homage and service to the king or to the next chief above Taylor 1962:35 and Beattie i954a:2o is to confound personal for political loyalty and service If feudal obligations are to remain distinct from those expressing another relationship we must know what we mean by personal
In any small scale agrarian society virtually all social and political relations will be personal in the simple sense of face to
Beattie draws upon Stenton and treatment of Bloch for his concept face
However the fact that political officials are personally known to one another does not mean that relations of political dependence are personal the sense implicit in the vassalage relationship vassal is primarily retainer whose homage has bound him to be his man with responsibility wider and more diffuse than performing simple service While the vassalage contract is not mere barter agreement for land and labor it is still contractual arrangement between private individuals If political authority de volved upon the vassals of kings and other lords in medieval Europe it was not the function of that contract to confer it Rather through the decline of the apparatus of State power and as an attempt to shore up failing governmental institutions contracting individuals often acquired political roles1
In Bunyoro on the other hand the delegation of authority to subordinates is the fundamental agency of centralized power the substance of the State apparatus and the determining element in the relations between the mühama and the chiefs
The idea of homage is not present in this relationship Similarly the idea of protection can be seen as the responsibility to state officials of the political authorities rather than the contractual obligation of feudal lords Moreover the mystic identification of the mühama with the whole country and his calculated removal from the cross loyalties of kinship and clanship Beattie 1961:25-29 argue against the partiality implicit in the idea of special protection for vassals Is the concept of fiefholding applicable to Bunyoro Here again we must warn against confounding the delegation of territorial author ity with fiefholding According to Margaret Chilvers 1959:382)
The fact of the association of office and landholding combined with authority of some sort exercised by landlords over peasants would if it were adopted as our definition place not only the Bito-ruled states but many others in Europe Asia and Africa in the feudal category Therefore following Chilvers the central institution of feudalvassalage has been singled out in our definition rather than the association of land and office holding In Bunyoro as in Buganda the system of the delegation of territorial political power in the form of estates does not constitute feudo-vassalage institution While authority is not conceived of kinship terms Taylor 1962:36) neither is it properly understood feudal regime Although an effect of the grant of territory was the provision of the means of maintaining the territorial chief the taxes and tribute which supported him were not his feudal dues They were the taxes and tribute owed the mühama To analyze the feudal elements of Rwanda social and political structure three distinctive features will be examined the centralized system of administra tion the military organization and the unique structure of personal dependence called ubuhake All these structures exist within the framework of monarchy in which as in the other kingdoms studied the king mwami claims absolute power Furthermore the vertical structures of administration military and ubuhake lie across hori zontal division of society into more or less distinct that is hereditary or racial occupational groups ranked in social and political status The pastoral Tutsi dominate by virtue of their control of the political apparatus as well as the control of cattle the symbols of wealth and power culturally recognized by their society Maquet 196 ib 133 It is the monopoly of power by the dominant Tutsi that is the central feature of Rwandese political life and the structures we will examine serve primarily to concentrate and regulate the control of the Tutsi caste and the Tutsi monarch Codere)
The territorial rights and duties of chiefs were tax collection organizing public works levying armies hearing legal cases guarding cattle and keeping the peace ROSCOE 1925:54-55)
The administrative structure of Rwanda1 bears some resemblance to those of Bunyoro and Buganda
The most significant complicat ing factor is the separation of the roles in the dual administration of cattle people and farmers As in the other kingdoms beneath the king is category of great chiefs here called stool who are responsible for the administration of the major territorial divisions of the realm The next level however sees the functions of admin istration divided between land chief and cattle chief sharing dominion over the same district or canton Each chief had specific judicial and administrative roles the one over land tenure and agri cultural tribute the other over grazing rights and the affairs of the pastoralists At lower level the functions were reunited in single authority the hill chief Beneath these authorities lineage heads were the last intermediary between king and commoner
The prin ciple functions of the administrative hierarchy were tax collection and the maintenance of central authority and hence Tutsi domination2
At this point it is hardly necessary to do more than suggest that the administrative structure is based on relations between ruler and his political subordinates and not on contract of vassalage Homage and fealty protection and maintenance as apply to feudal relations are neither fundamental nor significant for administrative relations as found in these kingdoms This is nowhere clearer than in Rwanda where personal ties are embodied in distinct institution ubuhake which though it overlaps and reinforces the already inter related administrative and military systems is neither necessary nor important to them Kagame 1962:7)
The division of responsibility between land chiefs and cattle chiefs opens new avenue in the consideration of the problem of fief-holding in East African societies If we were to accept the royal grant of land rights to functionary as fief we must then consider as fief royal grant of cattle rights to corresponding individuals where cattle serve the same social economic and political functions as land in the feudal contract According to our dictum that the social content and not the peculiar form of service or in this case maintenance is relevant to our analysis3 we must find cattle as valid form of maintenance as land This question is however merely hypothetical
Reference throughout is to Central Rwanda outlying regions having been imperfectly absorbed within the central structures HERTEFELT 1965 :407-409 and 1962 :23-24 For historical perspective cf VANSINA 1962 For description and analysis of the administration cf HERTEFELT 1962 62-64 or MAQUET i96ib:ioi-io9
For land tenure cf MAQUET and NAIGIZIKI 1957 or VANSINA 1963 Cf supra Curiously the historical root of the word nef is related to the German word for cattle indicating possibility that cattle served the original vassalage agreements as form of maintenance BLOCH 1964:165) in that we have any case rejected the efhold nature of political tenure in land Rwanda Paralleling the administrative hierarchy is another instrument of social control combined with military duties the cattle and social armies of Rwanda As all the territory was subdivided in the admin istrative system so all the patrilineages and all the cattle of the land were organized into military or para-military regimental system At the head of each army composed of warrior section of Tutsi and herder section of Hutu was chief directly appointed by the usami Often one individual might join the roles of military and administrative chief
The power of the military chief lay in his ability to control the distribution of cattle attached to his army The control of the military system by the Tutsi aristocracy provided supplemental means for the ruling orders to manipulate the wealth and power of Rwanda Kagame 1963:8-10 and Maquet 1961 115-124) The army chief shares number of common attributes with the vassal or baron of medieval England First he is personally respon sible to his overlord the mwami for the performance of military services
To perform these services he received degree of jurisdic tion over non-military personnel in the persons of peasant cultivators and in Rwanda pastoralists However the differences are more striking and significant
The military service performed is different in style and nature being the organization and leadership of large fighting forces and their logistic support rather than personal service by his shield Kagame 1962:32-41 passim Furthermore in as much as the main function of the army was that it acted as an agency for the redistribution of wealth i.e consumption goods and cattle Maquet i96ib:i2o) the role of the army-chief was that of an agent of central authority fundamentally akin to the role of an administrative chief but performing different State functions The strictly military duties of the army system were secondary and indeed other institutions and arrangements might be sought as more appro priate to the problems of warfare and defense of territory1
In any case the social relations embodied in the military system are not in the nature of service to his lord as would be found in vassalage relationship based on military obligation2
The system of ubuhake or clientage as Maquet calls it is perhaps the closest we shall come to finding vassalage and fief institutions in this examination
Maquet states quite directly that this institution is feudal that is based on an agreement between two individuals who unequally partake of the symbols of wealth and power
The role of the Twa pygmies may deserve consideration in this regard For service and fee in England cf POLLOCK and MAIT-LAND 1952 VOI 1:252-266 The person who in that respect is inferior to the other asks for his patronage and as counterpart offers his services Maquet 33
This agreement or contract ties together two people by bonds of personal obligation and commitment This seems to approach the essential quality of vassalage contract in the ubuhake system1 The gayagu or client offers homage and service
He becomes the man of his patron owing him loyalty and respect before others regardless of his political or social status He was required by the agreement to perform services of personal nature for his lord such as accompanying him when travelling attending him at his manor Gravel 1965) supporting him in warfare carrying his messages and if the garagu was Hutu mending his fences and performing menial labor services These services were owed to the lord as result of the contract of ubuhake and not by virtue of his political or social position While clientage relationships were not the preserve of the upper class or extending virtually throughout the social scale the services demanded of Tutsi clients by their Tutsi patrons differ in some respects from those demanded of Hutu clients
The effect of this difference was to accent the social and political superiority of the Tutsi by emphasizing the consilium aspect of homage and mini mizing the socially degrading labor service
We might construe this Tutsi-Tutsi contract as closer to true vassalage and see in the TutsiHutu or Hutu-Hutu relationship similarity to the medieval institu tion of servile homage an imitative form developed by the European peasantry On his part the shebuja or patron owed his client protection and maintenance Protection was evidenced by the support in courts of law and his economic assistance in cases of the payment of fines or compensation and political aid in securing justice by blood feud
The support of an important patron in law court cannot be regarded lightly in society where justice can be prejudiced by the existence of caste or color line Maintenance was manifold obli gation including economic supplements in cases of extreme hardship support for orphans and widows and contributions to bride wealth However the basic source of maintenance as provided by the ubuhake agreement was the grant of usufructuary rights over cattle No con tract was complete without this element which closely corresponds to the concept of fief
The client was granted full rights of owner ship over milk the male increase of the cattle and the meat and skin of cow who had died The patron always retained the ultimate ownership of the cattle as well as the female increase insuring the permanent control of wealth in cattle to the lord and in effect to the Tutsi caste There are number of significant dissimilarities between the ubuhake agreement and the contract of vassalage which affect the nature of the social relations of each system First is the pervasive ness of the ubuhake agreement While the institution of vassalage was largely restricted to the upper classes of Europe Bloch 1964:327)1 in Rwanda virtually every man except the mwami had patron and only the lowest Hutu peasant or Twa potter were without clients It was far too impractical to be without patron if one was weak making freedom of contract socially illusory Maquet i96ib:i34)2
Secondly the functioning of the system tended to strengthen the hold of the ruling class and the monarch on their subordinates and preserve the social power of the Tutsi and the political power of the central government It was supplemental to the administrative and military hierarchies reinforcing their powers of social control but not usurping political power per se Lastly it can be questioned to what extent the benefice of cattle served to maintain the services In the case of Tutsi-Tutsi agreements the transfer of cattle helped preserve the social status and allowed him the leisure to perform his duties as councilor However in Tutsi-Hutu agreements it would seem the flow of goods was from client to patron from the lower orders of society to the upper The element of maintenance seems illusory here as the economic benefits of the cattle were offset by the extortionate opportunities presented to the lord These factors however result from the domination of the Tutsi rather than from the nature of the ubuhake agreement which probably served to amel iorate the social exploitation of the pastoral monopolists In attempting to analyze the feudal aspects of the social and political relations of the three interlacustrine societies clear concep tion of feudal institutions was sought At the core of the concept of feudalism complex of interpersonal relationships having the force
We therefore prefer the application of the terms patron and client drawn from Roman institution in which both patrician and plebeian classes could establish dependent relations ROSTOVTZEFF 1960:44) Note Les Twa plus bas encore dans la hiérarchie sociale ne faisaient toutefois pas partie dans ensemble de la structure de clientèle HERTEFELT 1965:68) of law which has been called feudo-vassalage was delineated This structure of personal contractual arrangements provided European feudal societies with system of land use and of military service and basis for the distribution of power among the members of the ruling military aristocracies In other words the institutions of vassalage and nefholding form the basic structure of society and politics in feudal regime
The examination of the social and political systems of Buganda Bunyoro and Rwanda for feudo-vassalage institutions uncovered two examples of fundamentally analogous structures
The Ganda system of batongole chiefs and the Rwanda ubuhake agreement seem to be the only institutions these kingdoms which are based on personal contractual relations between two individuals corresponding to lord and vassal
Moreover the administrative systems of hierarchy of chiefs which have given rise to the application of feudal terms to these kingdoms have been found to be based on different organiza tional principles and social relations These political structures cannot be pressed into feudal model without severe distortion of either the model or the political systems of those States One might suggest that the notions of absolutist monarchy and administrative centralization through appointed regional authorities better describe the common political stock of the interlacustrine States The concepts of bureauc racy of royal intendancy of caste domination on the other hand may prove more useful tools delineating the distinctive features of Buganda Bunyoro and Rwanda respectively
In any case by implying contractual basis in the political arrange ments of the kingdoms surveyed feudal notions fail to impart clarity to either the general or the particular modes of political organization in these States 
